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Abstract (206 words) 
To many, the idea of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) 
killing human beings is grotesque. Yet critics have had 
difficulty explaining why it should make a significant moral 
difference if a human combatant is killed by an AWS as 
opposed to being killed by a human combatant. The purpose 
of this paper is to explore the roots of various deontological 
concerns with AWS and to consider whether these concerns 
are distinct from any concerns that also apply to long-
distance, human-guided weaponry. We suggest that at least 
one major driver of the intuitive moral aversion to lethal 
AWS is that their use disrespects their human targets by 
violating the martial contract between human combatants. 
On our understanding of this doctrine, service personnel cede 
a right not to be directly targeted with lethal violence to 
other human agents alone. Artificial agents, of which AWS 
are one example, cannot understand the value of human life. 
A human combatant cannot transfer his privileges of 
targeting enemy combatants to a robot. Therefore, the 
human duty-holder who deploys AWS breaches the martial 
contract between human combatants and disrespects the 
targeted combatants. We consider whether this novel 
deontological objection to AWS forms the foundation of 
several other popular yet imperfect deontological objections 
to AWS. 
 
Scholars have voiced objection to the development and 
deployment of fully autonomous weapon systems (AWS) largely for 
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reasons having to do with technical limitations or political 
ramifications. For example, some have raised concerns that such 
systems might make political leaders more cavalier about engaging 
in military action;1 that non-state actors would readily be able get 
ahold of small and relatively cheap AWS;2 or that such systems 
would be vulnerable to hacking.  Still other scholars raise principled 
objections to the use of AWS, suggesting that such systems should 
not be deployed even if the political and technical concerns could 
be addressed or shown to be no different in kind than concerns about 
widely accepted long-distance weaponry. Some have worried that 
AWS would not be able to adhere to principles of Distinction and 
Proportionality and would thereby violate the Laws of Armed 
Conflict or jus in bello restrictions;3 that there would be no 
accountability for war crimes perpetrated by robots;4 and that the 
use of AWS demonstrates a “profound disrespect” for the enemy.5 
To many, the idea of robots autonomously deciding to kill 
human beings is grotesque, and yet critics have had difficulty 
explaining why it should make a significant moral difference if a 
human combatant is killed by an AWS as opposed to being killed 
by a human combatant.6 It has been especially challenging to 
articulate the moral difference between AWS and widely accepted 
and commonly used forms of long-distance human-controlled 
weapons. Some have suggested that concerns with AWS such as the 
epistemic uncertainty of the authorizing human agent, the 
metaphysical indeterminacy of the AWS's victims, and the lack of 
an interpersonal relationship between human agent and victim, are 
also relevant to long-distance, human controlled weapons. If this is 
the case, the conventional acceptability of long-distance, human 
                                               
1 Docherty (2012). Docherty raises a number of additional objections to 
the deployment of AWS including some of the following ones on this 
list. Also see Kahn (2017). 
2 Burri (2017). 
3 Armin Krishnan (2009); Guarini M, Bello P. (2012); Sharkey (2007: 
122).  
4 Sparrow (2007); Roff (2013). 
5 Sparrow (2016a). 
6 Sparrow cf. Robillard (forthcoming); Burri, (2017). 
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controlled weapons would seem to create grounds for accepting the 
use of AWS.7 The purpose of this paper is to explore the roots of 
various deontological concerns with AWS—concerns that seek to 
identify a principled constraint against the use of AWS—and to 
consider whether these concerns are distinct from any concerns that 
also apply to long-distance, human-guided weaponry. We will not 
take a stand as to whether deontological concerns trump 
consequentialist considerations in favor of using or not using AWS 
in future conflicts. We hope our discussion contributes to a 
resolution of this debate. We suggest that at least one major driver 
of the intuitive moral aversion to lethal AWS is that their use 
disrespects their human targets by violating the martial contract 
between human combatants. On our understanding of this doctrine, 
service personnel cede a right not to be directly targeted with lethal 
violence to other human agents alone. This ceding is not to humans 
per se, or humans by fiat, but to agents able to reason about moral 
considerations (including whether to exercise their rights at others’ 
expense). Such agents would also need to have an understanding of 
the authority of moral reasons, reasons grounded in the value of 
human life. Artificial agents, of which AWS are one example, cannot 
understand the value of human life because they lack the experience 
of having personal projects or sensing their own mortality. Since a 
duty-holder cannot transfer his duties and privileges to an entity 
incapable of bearing those duties and privileges, a human combatant 
cannot transfer his privileges of targeting enemy combatants to a 
robot. Therefore, the human duty-holder who deploys AWS 
breaches the martial contract between human combatants and 
thereby disrespects the targeted combatants.  
 
1  Some deontological objections to AWS 
The most interesting objections to AWS are deontological in 
flavor. In this section, we catalogue what we take to be the major 
deontological objections to the development and deployment of 
AWS and identify their weaknesses. In the next section, we develop 
                                               
7 [Blinded for peer review] 
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a novel deontological objection to the development and deployment 
of AWS. 
To begin our brief survey of deontological objections to AWS 
it is important to be clear about what we take to be conditions 
under which an objection counts as a deontological objection to 
AWS. Generally speaking, deontological moral theories impose 
constraints on the promotion of the good.8 That is, whatever we 
take to determine the intrinsic value of states of affairs, a 
deontological moral theory will sometimes prohibit the maximal 
promotion of that value.9 It will require that we sometimes do less 
than the best. Therefore, we take a ‘deontological’ objection to AWS 
to be any objection that would count against the use of AWS even 
if AWS were to yield optimal outcomes vis-à-vis our legitimate 
military aims. Suppose that our legitimate military aims are 
achieving our just cause while minimizing casualties to civilians, 
enemy combatants, and our own military personnel.10 A 
deontological objection to AWS would morally prohibit the 
deployment of AWS in cases where AWS would achieve just cause 
while minimizing casualties to civilians, enemy combatants, and our 
own military personnel. 
Because we are interested in deontological objections to 
AWS, we can set aside some familiar concerns. These are technical 
concerns whose force depends on the current state of artificial 
intelligence (AI) and which would thus lose their force were AI to 
reach a sufficient level of sophistication. For example, some have 
                                               
8 We do not mean to suggest that a theory or objection must posit the 
existence of constraints to count as deontological. See Scheffler (1984) for 
one exception. Generally speaking, however, deontological moral theories 
posit constraints.  
9 McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling (1998). 
10 This is admittedly an idiosyncratic way of characterizing the 
distinction between consequentialism and deontology and their 
relationship to Just War Theory, since some have argued that the 
principles of discrimination and proportionality are grounded in non-
consequentialist moral constraints (e.g., Nagel 1972). Still, for the 
purposes of our discussion, it is helpful to characterize discrimination and 
proportionality as valuable goals to be achieved in wartime rather than 
as constraints on the achievement of our goals. 
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worried that AWS would be ill-suited to discriminate between 
legitimate and illegitimate targets in chaotic environments.11 The 
inability to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets 
leads to a number of worries about whether AWS could satisfy jus 
in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality.12 These 
obstacles should not be underestimated, but they might be obviated 
in the near future by limiting the domain in which AWS operate,13 
and overcome in the distant future if AI technology becomes 
sufficiently sophisticated.14 If AWS were to become perfect 
replacements for human soldiers, we could use them to achieve the 
just cause of the war without the threat of indiscriminate or 
disproportionate harm. But not all objections to AWS can be 
resolved simply by advancing the state of the art. These are the 
deontological objections with which we are concerned. 
 
‘Responsibility Gaps’ and Respect 
The natural way to begin a survey of deontological 
objections to AWS is to imagine a future in which AI has reached 
a level of sophistication that rivals that of human agents. Robert 
Sparrow, in his influential 2007 article “Killer Robots,” imagines a 
state of AI where robot agency is, in virtually all functional respects, 
just like human agency.15 The root of Sparrow’s worry is that, under 
these circumstances, there would be no one we could appropriately 
                                               
11 Guarini and Bello (2012); Schmitt and Turner (2013). See also Asaro, 
Peter. "On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights, 
automation, and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making." 
International Review of the Red Cross 94.886 (2012): 687-709. 
12 For an excellent extended discussion of these challenges, see Sparrow 
(2015 and 2016a). 
13 See Schmitt (2013), Guarini and Bello (2012) and Sparrow (2016a). 
14 See Bostrom (2014) for a description of some of the paths to general 
AI that is far superior to human general intelligence. 
15 It is crucial to his argument, however, that robot agency falls short of 
full-blooded moral agency. The origins of this ‘responsibility gaps’ 
objection to AWS can be found in Matthias (2004). See also Roff 
(2013) for an extended discussion of responsibility and liability for 
AWS. 
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hold responsible for the decisions of AWS. Sparrow offers the 
following argument against AWS: 
1. It is morally impermissible to wage war unless we are able 
to justly hold someone morally responsible for the deaths of 
enemy combatants that we cause. 
 
2. Neither the programmer of AWS nor its commanding officer 
could justly be held morally responsible for the deaths of 
enemy combatants caused by AWS. 
 
3. We could not justly hold AWS morally responsible for its 
actions, including actions that would be war crimes had they 
been committed by a human soldier. 
 
4. There are no other plausible candidates whom we might hold 
morally responsible for the deaths of enemy combatants 
caused by AWS. 
 
5. From 2, 3, and 4: Therefore, there is no one whom we may 
justly hold responsible for the deaths of enemy combatants 
caused by AWS. 
 
6. From 1 and 5: Therefore, it is impermissible to wage war 
through the use of AWS. To do so would be to treat our 
enemy like vermin, as though they may be exterminated 
without moral regard at all.16 
 
Elsewhere, two of the authors of this paper have suggested that 
Sparrow’s argument would lose its force if AWS ever became 
flawless replacements for human soldiers. If AWS never makes a 
mistake in warfare, it is mysterious why it would be problematic 
that, were it to make a mistake, there would be no one to hold 
morally accountable.17 Recently, however, Sparrow has further 
                                               
16This summarized version of Sparrow’s argument is taken from [blinded 
for peer review]. 
17 [Blinded for peer review.] 
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elaborated that using highly sophisticated AWS to wage war “treats 
our enemy like vermin” because it fails to establish an “interpersonal 
relationship” with the enemy that justly waging war requires. 
Drawing on Thomas Nagel’s canonical “War and Massacre,” 
Sparrow argues that waging war justly requires “establishing this 
interpersonal relationship with those who are the targets of a lethal 
attack… and acknowledging the morally relevant features that 
render them combatants or otherwise legitimately subjected to a 
risk of being killed.”18 But, Sparrow claims, this interpersonal 
relationship cannot be established when an AWS decides to target 
someone, because even a highly sophisticated AWS is not a full-
blooded moral agent capable of appreciating or judging its reasons 
for action. It is not a member of the Kantian “Kingdom of Ends.” 
For this reason, “in some fundamental sense, there is no one who 
decides whether the target of the attack should live or die… the 
agency of the robot would intervene so as to make it implausible to 
describe the person who launched the robot as having killed anyone 
at all.”19 And this, Sparrow suggests, is “profoundly disrespectful” to 
the enemy.20 
But, as Sparrow acknowledges,21 it is questionable whether 
an AWS can sever the interpersonal relationship between the target 
of the AWS and the person who deploys the AWS unless AWS are 
full-blooded moral agents. And in that case, the responsibility gap 
dissolves, because AWS would be members of the Kingdom of Ends, 
capable of acknowledging the morally relevant features of 
combatants that render them liable to harm. 
Furthermore, two of the authors of this paper have argued 
that it is consistent with the considerations advanced by Nagel in 
“War and Massacre” that AWS could be more respectful of 
combatants and non-combatants than conventional means of 
warfare.22 First, if AWS become vastly superior to human soldiers 
at discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate targets, then 
                                               
18 Sparrow (2016a: 106). 
19 Sparrow (2016b: 402). 
20 Sparrow (2016a: 106). 
21 Ibid: 107. 
22 [Blinded for peer review.] 
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AWS would be needed to address Nagel’s concern that a state 
waging war not “tak[e] aim [at enemy combatants] through the 
mundane life and survival of their countrymen, instead of aiming at 
the destruction of their military capacity” (1972: 139). One cannot 
be accused of violating Nagel’s requirement if one completely avoids 
civilian casualties. In a rejoinder, Sparrow contends that it is a 
mistake to focus solely on the non-combatants spared by AWS in 
deciding whether AWS count as expressing ‘respect’ for those they 
target. Some weapons, including AWS can be properly considered 
mala in se (evil in and of themselves) because they fail to 
acknowledge the humanity of those they target, and because they 
increase the horror of war (2016: 401). We find Sparrow’s support 
for these remarks unconvincing.23 Other forms of warfare considered 
to be mala in se (e.g., starvation, poison gas, biological warfare, 
flamethrowers, napalm) are cruel to those they target. They cause 
gratuitous suffering, and for that reason can accurately be said to 
“attack the men, not the soldier” (Nagel 1972: 141). This feature is 
not shared by AWS. As articulated, Sparrow’s objections to AWS 
miss the mark. Still, we will ultimately try to vindicate part of 
Sparrow’s arguments. We agree with Sparrow that the inability of 
AWS to acknowledge the humanity of their targets poses a moral 
problem for their deployment, but Sparrow does not quite put his 
finger on the source of the problem. 
 
Acting for the right reasons 
A second important deontological objection to the use of 
AWS is such robots’ putative inability to act for reasons. The just 
war tradition demonstrates a concern with the reasons for which 
agents act both ad bellum and in bello. This is clear from the right 
intention criterion of jus ad bellum, but the commitment also 
manifests in discussions of the Doctrine of Double Effect and in the 
                                               
23 Sparrow’s derives support for his view from survey data (2016b: 402) 
about negative public feeling about AWS. While we do not wish to 
dismiss such data as irrelevant to the morality of deploying AWS, we 
believed it must be critically assessed before it is judged decisive evidence 
for the view that AWS are mala in se. 
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attention Christian just war thinkers have consistently paid to the 
proper orientation of the soldier’s will when committing violent 
acts.24 This concern—with the intentions of individual actors in 
bello, not just policymakers ad bellum—survives through Nagel’s 
aforementioned “War and Massacre” up to the present day. Until AI 
become the full-blooded moral agents that Sparrow has in mind, it’s 
implausible to think that artificial intelligences could act for reasons 
at all. On the most plausible views of what it means to act for a 
reason, acting for a reason requires mental states such as desires and 
beliefs, which in turn likely require some kind of phenomenal 
consciousness.25 Even the most sanguine of artificial intelligence 
researchers think that replicating this robust mental capacity in AI 
lies decades in the future, if it is possible at all.26 (We will consider 
below some deontological concerns with using even highly 
sophisticated AWS of this sort.) If this is correct, AWS cannot act 
for reasons. A fortiori they cannot act for the right reasons when 
killing in war. However, notice that this objection cuts both ways: 
if AWS cannot act for the right reasons, then neither can they act 
for the wrong reasons. Whether this objection is successful depends 
on how we ought to interpret the purported requirement that 
soldiers act for the right reasons. Moreover, the success of this 
objection ultimately depends on the reasons for which most human 
soldiers act in deciding whom to kill. If most human soldiers act 
from evil motives in wartime, then a moral concern for not acting 
for the wrong reasons would compel us to welcome human 
replacement by AWS. 
                                               
24 See, for example, Augustine’s letter 189 to Boniface, §6. See also, 
[blinded for peer review]: “Augustine believes there are moral 
requirements for soldiers themselves to act for the right reasons. Aquinas, 
for his part, quotes Augustine approvingly in his Summa Theologica 
(1920). According to Reichberg, Aquinas is principally concerned with 
‘the inner dispositions that should guide our conduct in war’ (2010: 264)” 
(2015). 
25 [Blinded for peer review] develop this objection. They cite Davidson 
(1964 and 1978) as a proponent of the desire-belief model. They cite 
Darwall (1983), Gibbard (1990), Quinn (1993), Korsgaard (1996), among 
others as proponents of the taking as a reason model. 
26 See Bostrom (2014) and [blinded for peer review]. 
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 2  Mutual Liability to Harm 
So far we have catalogued what we take to be the major 
deontological objections to the development and deployment of 
AWS and we have identified salient weaknesses. In the remainder 
of the paper we develop a new deontological objection to AWS. In 
this section we offer an account of the moral foundation of the 
mutual liability to harm by combatants in wartime. In sections 3 
and 4 we consider whether this moral foundation renders 
impermissible the use of AWS that target and kill enemy 
combatants. In section 5 we explore whether this objection 
underpins the aforementioned deontological objections, namely (a) 
that the use of AWS leads to responsibility gaps, (b) that it 
expresses a profound disrespect for enemy combatants, and (c) that 
AWS cannot act for the right reasons in deciding whom to kill. 
Our starting point for the discussion in this section is the 
doctrine of the moral equality of combatants (MEC).27 If we wonder 
whether the killing of human combatants by machines is morally 
permissible, a natural place to start is with an account of what 
makes mutual killing permissible between enemy human 
combatants. We will sketch a brief account of the dynamic whereby 
voluntary (i.e. non-conscripts) combatants can be modeled as 
agreeing to equal belligerency rules. (A more complex argument for 
why conscripts have to accept this regime will be begged here.) 
There is a robust debate amongst just war scholars regarding the 
viability of MEC as a moral theory. The view of some of the authors 
of this article is that the traditional, post-Westphalian construal of 
MEC--wherein conventional combatants on both sides of an inter-
state war28 have equal permissions to engage in norm-guided 
military violence and equal liabilities to being targeted with the 
same--is morally correct. The arrangement is not just a convenient 
legal regime but reflects what some call the “deep morality” of war. 
                                               
27 See [omitted for blind review]. 
28 MEC also covers privileged irregular combatants like 
insurgents who wear uniforms, carry their arms in the open, and obey the 
norms and laws of war. 
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We clearly do not have space here for a full-blown defense of MEC 
and a refutation of the doctrine’s “revisionist” critiques.29 We think 
our argument can proceed without such a defense though, because 
our aim is to provide a foundation to the intuitive aversion some 
apparently feel to the idea of AWS killing human beings. Our 
suspicion is that the intuitive aversion to killing by AWS is rooted 
in how service personnel—and perhaps the general public—
understand the profession of soldiering.30 If the aversion is linked to 
MEC, people who subscribe to MEC will feel this aversion regardless 
of whether MEC is morally correct. The account of MEC presented 
below will therefore not be presented with a hope of convincing 
skeptics, but of providing precise language for articulating the 
intuitive deontological objection. We understand that ours will be a 
controversial account but it seems to ably explain why many find 
AWS grotesque.  
 
An Account of the Moral Equality of Combatants 
A joint right is a moral right that can only be enjoyed in a 
collective setting, like a right to collective security or a right to 
political determination. Because joint rights can only be satisfied in 
a collective setting, joint rights engender collective responsibilities. 
People partially fulfill their collective moral responsibilities to meet 
joint rights by creating just institutions, including governments, 
that protect those rights. Once these institutions are established, 
collective moral responsibility is largely transferred to institutional 
actors whose properly-constituted institutional imperatives become 
moral norms for those actors because of their institutional role in 
protecting joint rights.31 For example, police hewing to their 
properly-constituted professional imperatives are fulfilling moral 
duties, not merely “doing their job.” People outside the institutions 
                                               
29 One of the authors advances that full-blown defense and 
critique in [blinded for review]. 
30 One of the authors has spent a career working with the US 
military. In his experience, service personnel overwhelmingly accept MEC 
for conventional adversaries.  
31 Seumas Miller, (2010: 57, 68, 77, 80). 
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must support the (just) institutions when those institutions are the 
most effective instruments available to protect others’ joint and 
individual rights.32 One meets this duty to support just institutions 
by paying for their maintenance, complying with the rules of the 
institutions, and refraining from attempts to subvert them. The 
duty also entails ceding certain claim-rights to the institutions’ 
professionals (explained below).33 As with other duties, compliance 
respects others’ rights but also contributes to a reciprocal system 
ultimately protecting the rights of the duty-bearer. So, for example, 
paying tax to support one’s local police department ideally helps 
protects one’s neighbors’ rights as well as one’s own.  
One owes a duty to the inhabitants of a state to uphold just 
institutions and “pays” what one owes to the government employees 
who are those inhabitants’ agents. A duty to deliver X to Y means 
one cedes to Y a claim-right against certain forms of treatment that 
are necessary for the provision of X. In just states, a duty to uphold 
just institutions means ceding certain claim-rights against otherwise 
rights-violating activities of state agents, where 1) those state agents 
are competently pursuing their obligations and duties, and 2) when 
insisting on one’s rights would otherwise prevent state agents from 
serving their principals. So for example, one indirectly meets one’s 
duty to respect and protect others’ rights by supporting law 
enforcement institutions and ceding certain claim-rights to the 
(norm-compliant) police who protect one’s neighbors. This ceding 
                                               
32  Miller (2010: ch. 2), Rawls (1999: 351–4), and Waldron (1993: 3–30, 
26, 28) derive the duty differently. (Cf. Nozick 1974: 102, 110). Support 
ought to be withdrawn if the institutions become significantly corrupt 
and fail to meet the goals for which they were established over a long 
period of time. Yet the anarchic risks of non-compliance with 
institutional rules are significant so support for institutions generally 
oriented to morally valuable goods is indicated even in the event that the 
institution pursues a particular unjust project. For example, tax-payers 
should not cease paying tax to support public schools because of a 
dubious curriculum implemented one year. Citizens should not overthrow 
their governments because of a bad foreign policy decision.  
33 Waldron, 8-10. 
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of certain claim-rights gives the police liberty-rights in turn, creating 
the space for them to perform their norm-compliant actions without 
wronging the affected parties. This dynamic explains how police in 
a just society can arrest, detain, and non-violently interrogate 
someone in their jurisdiction without wronging him, so long as they 
hew to the norms of due process. Incompetent, brutal, or corrupt 
police activities are not covered by this permission. Without this 
ceding of rights, police would be morally prohibited from 
investigating and arresting suspicious persons, and the rights of 
potential and actual crime victims would go unprotected. In this 
way, police benefit the very inhabitants who can be modeled as 
ceding rights to them.  
Importantly, the duty to support just institutions is not 
restricted to institutions of one’s own state; it extends in different 
ways to foreign institutions. The duty to support just institutions is 
derived from the more basic duty to aid and protect the rights of 
other human beings—a duty all people (capable of being duty-
bearers) owe to all other people, regardless of national identity or 
citizenship. So, for example, one cedes claim- and liberty-rights to 
the state agents of a foreign state when insisting on those rights 
would morally impede foreign agents from performing their duties 
to protect their own citizens, residents, and guests. For this reason, 
a tourist’s rights are not violated when she is compelled to obey the 
commands of foreign police officers when abroad, when those officers 
are acting as agents of just institutions and conducting themselves 
in just, norm-compliant ways. 
Normally, the duty to support just institutions imposes few 
demands on a person in her home state for the benefit of people in 
other states. In war-time though, the duty to support just foreign 
institutions can serve as the ground for the moral equality of 
combatants and egalitarian military norms. In war, the duty to 
support just foreign institutions entails ceding claim-rights against 
foreign agents acting according to their professional duty. 
Combatants then are not wronged when targeted by norm-
compliant enemy combatants representing just political entities. 
Professionals are duty-bound to adhere to professional norms 
guiding professionals to achieve the morally valuable goals of their 
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professions in a way optimizing trade-offs between the efficient 
pursuit of those goals and rights infringements to those affected in 
the pursuit of those goals. Service members can be modeled as 
ceding claim-rights against being targeted with lethal violence by 
enemy combatants according to the terms of military norms 
optimizing a balance between maximizing the one military’s 
interests while minimizing suffering to their enemy. This is beneficial 
to all military personnel insofar as it enables them to fulfill their 
duties by achieving the morally valuable goals of their professions, 
qua agents responsible for upholding just institutions. For example, 
the principle of necessity benefits service personnel qua agents of 
just institutions by permitting them to target enemy personnel 
whom they need to target in order to seize an objective. The 
principle of necessity also benefits service personnel qua patients by 
sparing them from gratuitous violence. Combatants can be modeled 
as ceding these rights to norm-compliant adversarial personnel 
because of their duty to support just institutions, but also because 
they benefit from the adversarial belligerent practice of which these 
actions are a part. The members of both militaries are benefited by 
the adversarial practice of which they take a direct part because the 
practice permits their own state to secure its legitimate national 
security goals without risking undue suffering on the part of its 
noncombatants and combatants. 
If service members did not cede claim-rights against being 
directly targeted by norm-compliant enemy personnel representing 
basically just states,34 foreign military personnel would be wrong to 
serve their state in the same way the first military was permitted to 
serve its basically just state. Ex ante, there is no basis on which to 
model one group of service members’ duty to protect their political 
entity while withholding permission to another group performing 
the same duty. We cannot model combatants’ consent to a regime 
which only extends belligerent privileges to the just side since there 
is no international body with enforcement mechanisms which can 
definitively say which war is just. States are in a quasi-anarchic 
international system in which political leaders have to (ideally) 
                                               
34 Basically just states largely respect the basic rights of their inhabitants 
and equitably enforce the law; they need not be democratic.  
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make their best judgment about when war is warranted to protect 
their state’s interests. An asymmetrical regime only permitting 
combatants on the just side to fight would be unworkable as there 
would be no clear authority to consult about the justice of a war.  
 It is important to stress that service members’ duty to 
observe their professional norms and their liability to being the 
direct target of norm-compliant enemies is not based on their 
express consent. On the picture we are describing, by voluntarily 
enlisting, enlistees accept the role of service members and take on 
the norms attendant to that role in an adversarial system. Service 
members cannot be modeled as waiving their rights to life per that 
role—as this would permit anyone to kill them. They do not 
expressly waive their claim-rights against being killed,35, but have 
to be modeled as ceding claim-rights against being directly targeted 
by combatants representing basically just states with lethal action 
conforming to military norms. Service personnel in military A are 
not left defenseless by ceding these rights because their enemies in 
military B also cede claim-rights against being targeted by personnel 
in military A. Service personnel therefore gain reciprocal liberty-
rights to directly target their enemies. This permission creates the 
moral space for them to perform their duties in service of their 
political entities without wronging their combatant targets. 
Importantly, combatants can still be wronged by being wantonly 
killed, killed in ways that impose unnecessary levels of suffering, or 
killed by unprivileged irregular militants and ordinary 
noncombatants (so long as the combatants confronted by the 
noncombatants are themselves hewing to their military norms). So, 
MEC still allows for cases in which combatants are wronged by 
being killed in combat. In the remainder of this essay we consider 
whether MEC entails that combatants would also be wronged if 
killed by an AWS. 
While this essay is focused on combatants, some might also 
wonder if AWS can wrong noncombatants by killing them. To that 
end, let us briefly discuss noncombatants’ rights. Noncombatants 
also have a duty to support just foreign military institutions because 
                                               
35 Cf. Hurka, 210. 
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of their duty to respect the rights of foreigners, including those 
rights best protected by militaries. This means noncombatants in 
country A cede certain claim-rights that would otherwise morally 
prohibit foreign service personnel in country B from protecting their 
people to the same extent service personnelA protect 
noncombatantsA. Since personnel can rarely fight a war without 
incurring noncombatant casualties, all noncombatants can be 
modeled as demanding their personnel fight just wars in order to 
protect their rights even while risking foreign noncombatant 
casualties. The alternative would be contingent pacifism. Yet since 
no one wants to be collaterally killed in a necessary military attack, 
all can be modeled as accepting for example, the military norm of 
proportionality, which permits the foreseen but unintentional killing 
of noncombatants but only when those casualties are the 
unavoidable cost of securing a tactical victory the impartial 
goodness of which outweighs the badness of the collateral harm. 
Proportionality maximizes the goods that all noncombatants want 
and minimizes the harms that none want. This means that 
noncombatants who have a military fighting on their behalf are not 
wronged if they are collaterally killed by enemy personnel 
scrupulously adhering to the norm of proportionality.  
 
3 Ceding claim-rights against being targeted to AWS? 
In this section, we investigate what ceding a right involves 
in order to determine if service personnel can be modeled as ceding 
to AWS their claim-rights against being targeted with lethal 
violence. We propose that they cannot. To claim otherwise is to 
commit a kind of category mistake. A member of class X cedes 
claim-right R to members of class Y, giving members of Y a liberty-
right to act in ways that would otherwise violate R. That a member 
of class Y has a liberty-right, a permission, to materially infringe R 
(that again, would otherwise violate R), means that a member of Y 
may permissibly choose to materially infringe R.36 Because 
                                               
36 To violate a right is to wrongfully infringe that right. 
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permissions only apply to duty-bearers, this permission presupposes 
that the permission-holder is capable of being a duty-bearer.  
Having the capacity for moral responsibility is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, component of being a duty-bearer. An agent with 
the capacity for moral responsibility (1) is able to voluntarily engage 
in intentional action; (2) is physically free to act or refrain from 
acting; (3) has a basic understanding about how her actions affect 
people and things; (4) can form an intention regarding a specific 
action and carry it out; and (5) can form her intentions in response 
to her recognition of reasons for action (be they moral or non-moral 
reasons). Those who are very young, mentally-ill, under hypnosis, 
or under the influence of mind-altering chemicals typically lack some 
of these components of responsibility.  
In addition to having the capacity for morally responsibility, 
a duty-bearer must be morally mature. Morally maturity includes 
(6) the ability to largely control one’s impulses; (7) having morally 
significant interests; (8) having an appreciation of the rights and 
duties relevant to her and others’ interests; (relatedly) (9) the ability 
to judge when she must restrain the pursuit of her own interests in 
accordance with her duties; and (10) the ability to weigh whether it 
is appropriate to exercise her own rights and privileges when she is 
not duty-bound to omit actions but when exercising her rights will 
affect others.37 Moral maturity is necessary to stand in a reciprocal 
relationship with duty-bearers—to be trusted with liberty-rights 
gained from relationship partners’ ceded claim-rights. For example, 
regarding (9), a landlord understands she is not permitted to build 
an addition on a building she does not own, but rather, has a duty 
to defer to the second building owner’s rights. She can understand 
and endorse that duty because she expects the other landlord to 
observe the same duty toward her property. Regarding (10), the 
                                               
37 As robots do not experience impulses of the relevant sort, we will 
ignore condition (6) for the rest of this essay. We also cannot answer 
whether an AWS can choose to omit the pursuit of its own rights in 
order to defer to others’ interests without answering the key question of 
this essay. That question is whether AWS have liberty-rights to kill 
enemy service members.  We will therefore put element (10) aside as 
well.  
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landlord may choose to delay evicting a tenant in her own 
building—in accordance with her rights—if that tenant’s delinquent 
rent is due to the onset of a serious medical condition.  
The reader will detect Aristotelian and Kantian echoes in 
condition (5), that duty-bearers are capable of recognizing and 
responding to moral reasons: moral maturity requires more than the 
avoidance of material rights violations. A comatose person violates 
no one's rights, but is not a duty-bearer. A little boy who refrains 
from hitting his brother might be praised for obedience rather than 
moral maturity because he omits violence merely from fear of 
consequences. Moral maturity requires compliance with outward 
expectations for self-elected moral reasons. Understanding and being 
able to weigh moral reasons necessitates appreciating the value of 
human life and well-being, autonomy, and associated moral concepts 
like rights and duties. If one fails to possess a concept of these 
considerations, then one cannot understand their significance or 
make judgments about the reasons that derive from them. 
Deontological explanations of the conditions under which 
rights can be ceded presuppose reciprocity amongst rights-holders 
and duty-bearers. One cedes rights to moral equals, agents with the 
same capacity for duty-bearing.38 An adult does not cede rights to 
                                               
38 In order to raise questions about AWS, Sparrow invokes Thomas 
Nagel's insistence that the moral basis of military violence has to be 
an interpersonal relationship between subjects, (Sparrow 2016a). Since 
an AWS is incapable of an interpersonal relationship, it cannot engage 
in permissible killing. Sparrow may be missing the force of Nagel's 
argument, which is focused on the recipient of military violence rather 
than the agent (1972). The recipient of violence is treated with 
respect when he is targeted for something he chose to do, like 
becoming a combatant, as opposed to something that has nothing to 
do with his subjectivity, like his ethnic affiliation or his presence in a 
certain area. The use of indiscriminate weapons is disrespectful 
because such weapons do not distinguish between people based on 
their status or activities. Writing in 1972, Nagel certainly must be 
assuming that a human agent is engaged in discriminate targeting, 
but it seems that a sophisticated AWS could engage in that kind of 
distinction, only targeting armed personnel or military materiel 
instead of targeting all people in an area. 
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children, adults with certain kinds of serious mental illness or 
senility, non-human animals, or machines.39 None are duty-bearers. 
We might end the essay here by arguing that human 
combatants cannot be modeled as ceding claim-rights to robots 
against being targeted with lethal violence. One does not, and 
cannot, cede rights to a toaster, drill, power lathe, or a plastic 
injection molder.  Watches, phones, and computers enjoy no claims 
over humans. Such conventional machines lack agency, the capacity 
to know, form intentions, have serious interests, restrain themselves, 
or understand rules as moral rules. They are mere tools for their 
human agents. Therefore, since it is a machine, no AWS can have 
permission to kill service personnel or noncombatants. From this 
observation, one can show that it would also be impermissible for a 
human service member to deploy AWS against human targets. A 
duty-bearer’s permission to harm enemy combatants does not 
include outsourcing the task of harming to an entity to which the 
enemy has not ceded and cannot cede his right against being 
harmed. Let us consider some civilian comparisons involving lesser 
material infringements. A client cedes privacy rights against her tax 
accountant’s viewing her financial documents, but the accountant’s 
permission to view confidential documents does not include a 
permission to send those documents to another firm for assessment. 
A business executive engaged in negotiations cannot transfer his 
decision-making authority to his seven-year-old daughter.  
This account of the moral objection to the use of AWS 
allows for a principled distinction between the use of AWS and the 
use of non-autonomous lethal weapons. One service member cedes 
a claim-right to another to target him with lethal non-autonomous 
weapons. This is because non-autonomous weapons do not target 
enemy combatants. When a soldier fires a gun at an enemy 
combatant the soldier, not the gun, targets the combatant. The 
service member is not subcontracting her agency to a non-
autonomous weapon even if it travels a long distance from the agent.    
                                               
39 One can also enjoy rights by virtue of natural properties, not strictly 
through having rights ceded to one. So babies might have rights despite 
not being eligible to be moral contract partners. 
Penultimate Draft — Final version available at 
Ethics & Information Technology 
 
 
20 
Yet ending the essay here would be unsatisfying for two 
reasons. First, advocates of AWS might argue that we are begging 
a question against them if we are relying on an argument equating 
future AWS with toasters. Perhaps future AWS will be so close to 
humans in relevant ways that we could think of them as morally 
responsible agents capable of bearing duties. It is hard to be 
definitive here because there is a divergence among thinkers 
regarding the conditions necessary for moral responsibility and the 
requirements for duty-bearing as well as uncertainty about what the 
future holds for AWS. Second, we are trying to provide the basis of 
a powerful but inchoate deontological objection to AWS killings; 
asserting that something lacks permission to do something seems to 
under-explain the intuitive horror or offense of being hunted and 
killed by a robot. There seems to be something else going on besides 
the mere impermissibility of the killing, which would also apply to 
being killed by an unprivileged belligerent like a terrorist. Yet the 
prospect of being killed by an unprivileged belligerent, even one who 
fights dirty by posing as a noncombatant, seems to conjure a very 
different emotion than being killed by a robot.40 
 
4 Can humans cede rights to sophisticated AWS? 
Could a service member be modeled as ceding his rights not 
to be targeted with lethal violence to a so-called sophisticated AWS? 
Let us assume a sophisticated AWS can discriminate between 
available targets; discern visible cues indicating a person’s 
combatant status, including signs of surrender; and adhere to jus in 
bello and the law of armed conflict when determining targets. We 
will be charitable to roboticist optimists and grant that a future, 
sophisticated AWS could have features that are at least functional 
equivalents to the components of human moral responsibility. That 
is, we grant that AWS would act just like a morally responsible 
agent would act.  
                                               
40 Full disclosure, one author of this paper does not sharing this 
asymmetrical aversion to death by robot compared with death by 
terrorist. 
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Yet it is hard to imagine how a service member can cede his 
rights not to be targeted with lethal violence to a so-called 
sophisticated AWS, because it is hard to imagine how an AWS that 
is (merely) functionally equivalent to a morally responsible agent 
can be a bearer of duties. Recall the relevant components of being 
a duty-bearer: having important interests, having the capacity to 
judge whether countervailing rights generate reasons against an 
action, and having the capacity to judge whether it is appropriate 
to act within one’s rights by frustrating others’ interests.41 An AWS 
can, in a sense, restrain its own projects (e.g. its programmed “goal” 
of targeting the enemy) in deference to noncombatants’ rights. An 
AWS can be programmed with moral rules, but it is difficult to 
conceive of how it can obey the rules while understanding them as 
moral rules. An AWS cannot do what any mentally normal adult 
can do, which is distinguish moral rules in kind from rules of a game 
or rules of small boat navigation or rules for matching shirts and 
ties.42 It would seem that an AWS cannot appreciate a set of rules 
as moral rules because an AWS cannot appreciate the value of 
human life or the authority of moral rules. Intuitively, appreciating 
the authority of moral rules requires understanding the rules as 
generating reasons for action. An AWS cannot do this, and it 
certainly cannot inform its targeting decisions on the basis of 
judgments about the reasons generated by those rules. To invoke 
the language used in section 3, AWS are morally immature and, 
hence, are not candidate duty-bearers. 
Let us consider in more detail the claim that a sophisticated 
AWS cannot understand the value of human life. There are two key 
aspects of human life a machine will never experience, which allow 
                                               
41 Some utilitarians would argue that agents have duties despite the non-
existence of rights. Since most contemporary just war theorists operate in 
a deontological idiom, we will confine our discussion to that broad moral 
framework.  
42 Psychopaths, famously, have trouble either distinguishing moral rules 
from non-moral ones (Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013), or else feeling 
the force of the moral rules they do recognize (Cima et al, 2010). See 
these, among other entries in the debate over the moral psychology of 
psychopathy. 
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any mentally-normal adult to appreciate the value of human life.43 
A mentally normal adult can appreciate his own mortality and the 
value of his own experiences and life projects. Understanding the 
moral gravity of human life requires, as a starting point, an 
appreciation of how much another person’s life (and the goods that 
it contains) matters to him. To use Robert Nozick’s phrase, it 
requires appreciating the significance to him of the fact that “His is 
the only life he has.”44 But this appreciation is possible only if I first 
experience the significance of my own life to me. Typically, this 
valuation is connected with an appreciation of mortality. To this 
point, it is often commented that teenagers are apt to behave 
recklessly because they think they are invincible. Part of maturity 
is a subtle appreciation of one’s own limits; a humbling that comes 
from a diminishment of physical powers; and perhaps, the 
imaginative and empathetic capacities needed to appreciate the 
position of the dead and dying. As one gets older, one comes to not 
merely cognitively grasp—--as children can—--but appreciate, 
affectively, that, just as grandma and grandpa, and Bob’s grandpa, 
and that poor kid in 12th grade who died in car accident, that I will 
die, too. 
Grasping the value of human life also requires that I can 
value and feel the weight of my projects and commitments. This 
valuation of projects comes from the experience of choosing these 
projects over others; the effort one expends to pursue them; and the 
pain one feels over failed endeavors. The reasons one values one’s 
commitments to projects, causes, people, and ideas is very complex, 
but in part comes from their centrality to one’s identity. They are 
important because they make one who one is. One’s identity is made 
up of an intricate web of commitments, experiences, knowledge, 
emotions, and aspirations. A moment’s deliberation reveals that 
everyone else is just as complex—good and bad, brave and weak—
                                               
43 Discussions of the ethics of AWS sometimes invoke vexed terms like 
“the value of human life,” “moral weight,” “moral gravity,” and so on. We 
want to be careful about the use of such evocative but imprecise terms 
lest arguments reduce to “I know it when I see it”-style appeals that beg 
questions against proponents of AWS. 
44 Nozick (1974: 33). 
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as dense and unique a creation as any pointillist work of art. So, it 
is fairly easy to conclude, their lives are just as valuable as one’s 
own.  
It seems incredible to us that an AWS could have this 
capacity to subjectively value its own existence and affectively 
project this value on the part of other people (or sophisticated 
robots), partly because we are skeptical that an AWS could feel 
anything at all. An AWS can perhaps be programmed to recognize 
the difference between a living and a dead person; it can be 
programmed to obey jus in bello; it can pass up potential targets 
that do not comply with the targeting criteria. An AWS can perhaps 
even surpass its initial programming by adapting to enemy tactics. 
Yet we cannot conceive of how an AWS can have a sense of its own 
history and its mortality. Even if it logs all its actions, it cannot 
cast its eyes over them in order to have a sense of self. It cannot 
fear death nor savor life. It cannot affectively project these qualities 
on the part of its human targets. It therefore cannot take life with 
an appreciation of the gravity of what it is doing. Again, even a 
sophisticated AWS would be morally immature and hence not a 
duty-bearer.  In this way, an AWS is in a worse position to 
appreciate the moral gravity of human life than the sociopath. For 
at least the sociopath appreciates the value of his life to him. He is 
simply unable to extend this concern to the lives of others. 
In a deontological idiom, people are modeled as ceding rights 
to, or demanding respect from, moral equals. Whether two 
individuals are moral equals is determined by whether they are 
endowed with the same basic moral capacities. The relevant moral 
background knowledge necessary to honor the moral power granted 
to the permission-holder by the rights-ceder includes an 
appreciation of the value of human life—the value of one’s own life 
and related moral interests, and the felt recognition of that 
symmetrical value in others.45 A service member can be modeled as 
                                               
45 Peter Asaro argues that the application of morally rich laws cannot be 
automated because such laws are designed to be interpreted by 
people. For example, the right to due process is essentially a right to 
"question the rules and the appropriateness of their application in a 
given circumstance, and to make an appeal to informed human 
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ceding a claim-right against being targeted with lethal violence to 
another combatant who understands the gravity of what he is doing, 
but not to an entity incapable of understanding this gravity.46 A 
wounded (volunteer) service member cannot rationally resent his 
conventional enemy assailant because the wounded service member 
freely entered into an adversarial, norm-governed, reciprocal 
relationship with his state’s future enemy combatants wherein he 
can be modeled as granting them liberty-rights to try to kill or 
wound him. Yet he cannot be modeled as ceding any rights to a 
robot and so the wounded service member can rationally resent the 
enemy officer who deployed the AWS against him. The enemy 
officer breaches the reciprocal relationship that gives both sets of 
service personnel in a war belligerent rights and liabilities.  This, we 
believe, is the intuitive foundation of Sparrow’s view that using 
AWS expresses a profound disrespect for the enemy. AWS-
deploying officers do not see their enemies as moral equals worthy 
of a reciprocal relationship.  
Noncombatants can be modeled as ceding claim-rights 
against having their lives endangered in the course of other agents 
pursuing their goals as a way of supporting just foreign institutions 
and as a reciprocal cost of demanding that their service personnel 
engage in activities endangering foreign noncombatants. Similar to 
                                               
rationality and understanding" (2012: 700). 
46 This argument also addresses Michael Robillard’s argument that the 
deontological concerns about AWS are misplaced because an AWS does 
not make genuine decisions of its own but merely acts on conditional 
orders programmed into it ahead of time by human beings. On 
Robillard’s view, the designers of the AWS are therefore responsible for 
the deaths directly incurred by the AWS (forthcoming: 6-7). A 
complicated technical and philosophical discussion would be required to 
address whether a given level of complex machine learning could result in 
an entity able to make genuinely autonomous decisions distinct from one 
of the conditional prompts programmed by the AWS engineers. To our 
point though, combatants do not enter into reciprocal moral relationships 
with weapon designers but rather with the agents who decide to use 
those weapon systems. If weapon designers did cede their claim-rights 
against being targeted by the combatants their weapon systems threaten, 
then, counter-intuitively, an elderly, retired engineer could be permissibly 
targeted in war-time by combatants threatened by aircraft the engineer 
contributed to the design of 30 years prior. 
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the above argument, this ceding of claim-rights can only be to duty-
holders who understand the value of human life and so will engage 
in proportionality calculations with an appropriate reluctance. 
Again, the idea is that moral respect requires more than deploying 
a non-duty-bearing robot that can perfectly  mimic the morally 
appropriate actions. On our view, an AWS and human who 
determined the same number of collateral casualties to be 
permissible, and then engaged in a targeting maneuver on the basis 
of this calculation, would not be performing the same action.  
Similarly, service personnel or noncombatants would be 
wronged if the enemy deployed an army of trained dogs, or of 
children, or of mental patients suffering from violent hallucinations, 
or of sociopathic killers who derive sadistic pleasure from killing. A 
service member or noncombatant cannot be modeled as ceding 
rights to members of these groups because they are not duty-
bearers. They are not duty-bearers because they lack one of the 
capacities necessary for qualifying as a duty-bearer: either they 
cannot see their enemy as morally valuable; they engage in no moral 
deliberation regarding their moral reasons; or they feel no moral 
tension over the action.47 By contrast, the duty-bearer has the 
capacity to suffer over the decision to take a life.48 She might need 
to take a quiet moment to herself after the act, or talk about it later 
with sobriety and agent-regret.49 The duty-bearer need not know 
the target's biography in order to feel this weight but needs to know 
that he is a human being with the same basic moral value as the 
agent.  
One concern with long-range killing is that it is easier to 
avoid experiencing the moral value of human life because the agent 
does not see the effects of his action. Yet a missile officer on a 
submarine nonetheless makes the targeting decision that he has been 
                                               
47 This argument is consistent with Nagel (1974: 136). 
48 Granted, an experienced service member may be able to kill later in 
his or her career without much emotion.  
49 “Agent regret” is a term introduced by Bernard Williams (1993), 
referring to the emotion one feels following one’s non-culpable causation 
of harm. 
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granted a right to do, and he is a duty-bearer. Because he is a duty-
bearer, he can still intellectually grapple with the weight of his 
actions, despite the distance between him and his target. An AWS 
of the sort we are considering here categorically cannot do so. Part 
of what makes the action weighty for the missile officer is the 
understanding that he and his fellow citizens are in principle 
vulnerable to an enemy’s attack as well, and that the foreign 
combatants’ and noncombatants’ lives areas significant to them as 
the officer’s life is to him.  
To conclude this section, some have suggested that the 
deontological concerns with AWS such as the epistemic uncertainty 
of the authorizing human agent, the metaphysical indeterminacy of 
the AWS's victims, and the lack of a personal relationship between 
human agent and victim, also speak against widely used long-
distance, human controlled weapons. The widespread acceptability 
of such human-controlled weapons undercuts the idea that there is 
a genuine and novel moral concern with AWS killing. The relevant 
moral difference between AWS and long-distance weapon systems 
is that AWS targets combatants for harm on its own. Yet, as we 
have argued, AWS cannot be the recipient of liberty-rights gained 
by humans ceding claim-rights to them. AWS lack a moral sense 
necessary to form reciprocal relations between combatants. We can 
conclude that AWS lack the sort of permission to kill service 
members in war that human service personnel can gain. 
It will not do to say that the human agents who deploy AWS 
are the recipients of the liberty-rights, because the intermediate 
status of AWS agency renders it impossible for those human agents 
to count as targeting combatants targeted by the AWS they deploy. 
A human service member’s permission to harm does not include a 
permission to deploy AWS against human targets, because a duty-
holder’s permission to harm enemy combatants does not include a 
permission to outsource the task of harming to an entity to which 
the enemy cannot cede his right against being harmed. It is for this 
reason that the victims of AWS attacks are disrespected by these 
attacks.  
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This last point requires some further elaboration, for 
someone might object to the foregoing discussion by presenting a 
dilemma: either AWS are sophisticated enough to adhere to the 
moral rules of armed conflict or they are not. If they are not 
sophisticated enough to do this, then AWS clearly aren’t agents, 
but they also should not be understood as killing the enemy. In this 
case, it’s simply unclear why we should think of using an AWS to 
kill people as “outsourcing the task of harming to an entity” at all. 
It’s the enemy combatant that kills people and the weapon is merely 
the means by which they do so.50 However, if AWS are sophisticated 
enough to be able to adhere to the moral rules governing armed 
conflict, then they must possess attributes sufficient for moral 
agency and hence duty-bearing. For example, one might think that 
in order to make proportionality calculations, AWS must be able to 
appreciate the moral value of human life and the moral reasons this 
value generates. If AWS are moral agents, then it seems that enemy 
combatants could cede to the AWS their right against being 
targeted. Whichever horn of the dilemma we choose, the objection 
goes, the MEC does not pose a moral problem for the deployment 
of AWS. 
We grant the point about unsophisticated AWS. In reply, 
let us focus on the future, highly sophisticated AWS, which can 
adhere to the moral rules of armed conflict at least as well as human 
combatants. Would the capacities possessed by such a machine be 
of the sort that would make it qualify as a moral agent to whom 
combatants can cede their claim rights against lethal targeting? We 
think not. The ability of an individual to adhere to the principles of 
just war theory and the laws of armed conflict depends on the 
interaction of a number of capacities, only some of which are 
relevant to moral agency. Some of the current authors [citation 
blinded for peer review] identify three types of mistakes that cause 
combatants to violate the principles of just war: empirical mistakes; 
practical mistakes; and genuine moral mistakes. Empirical mistakes 
are mistakes in discovering and identifying what the empirical facts 
are. To misidentify a potential target as carrying a gun when the 
                                               
50 We thank an anonymous referee for the Journal of Applied Philosophy 
for pressing us on this point. 
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object is in fact a camera is to commit an empirical mistake. 
Genuine moral mistakes, are mistakes in moral judgment, how to 
weigh the relevant moral considerations once they have been 
discovered, etc. These mistakes occur when we come to the wrong 
normative answer about a moral problem, even given full 
information about the empirical facts. Finally, practical mistakes 
can occur even when an individual has correctly identified the 
relevant empirical and moral facts, but fails in responding to those 
facts (e.g., by reacting a moment too slowly, or by missing one’s 
target and shooting an innocent person due to mental fatigue). This 
tripartite distinction between empirical, moral, and practical 
mistakes can help us to see how it is possible that a sophisticated 
AWS could be at least as good as human combatants at adhering 
to the moral rules governing armed conflict while nonetheless 
lacking the capacities sufficient for moral agency. Consider our 
previous discussion of this point: 
There is good reason for thinking that AWS could 
commit drastically fewer empirical and practical 
mistakes than human soldiers. Decisions on the 
battlefield must incorporate massive amounts of 
data, and they must be made in seconds. Adams 
(2001) points out that the tempo of warfare has 
increased dramatically in recent years, and so it will 
presumably only accelerate further. The human mind 
is only capable of incorporating so much information 
and acting on it so quickly. The day may come when 
human combatants simply cannot respond quickly 
enough to operate effectively in modern warfare. 
AWS has the potential to incorporate massive 
amounts of information, thereby avoiding the 
empirical and practical mistakes that humans are 
eventually bound to make in the ever-quickening 
pace of battle [citation blinded]. 
A sophisticated AWS might adhere at least as well as human 
combatants to the principles of just war because it makes fewer 
empirical and practical mistakes, even if it lacks some of the 
capacities necessary for moral agency. Such a machine, we propose, 
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could target enemy combatants in a way that counts as “outsourcing 
the task of harming” without possessing the capacities necessary for 
moral agency. Therefore, the objection by dilemma fails against our 
argument. As we wrote in the Introduction, our aim in this paper is 
not to conclusively argue against the use of AWS in all cases. Our 
argument does provide, to our eyes, a genuine and novel 
deontological objection to AWS killing.  
 
5 Vindicating moral objections from intentions, responsibility-gaps, 
and the interpersonal relationship between combatants 
 Earlier we claimed that the novel deontological objection to 
AWS proposed in this paper could be shown to underpin other 
deontological objections to AWS that had been raised in the 
literature. In closing we hope to make good on that promise. Though 
each of the objections we surveyed in section 3 misses the mark, 
each objection is, in some way or another, vindicated by the novel 
objection we have identified—that, according to the MEC, it is 
impermissible to deploy AWS to harm enemy combatants, because 
enemy combatants cannot cede rights against being harmed to 
AWS. 
Sparrow objects to the use of AWS because the use of AWS 
would leave us with no one to appropriately hold accountable for 
the enemy combatant deaths it causes. One worry for this objection 
was that it is unclear why it matters that there be someone to  hold 
accountable for the deaths of enemy combatants, if AWS adheres 
perfectly to the jus in bello principles of discrimination and 
proportionality. Our objection, based on MEC, can fill the 
explanatory gap: if there is no one to hold accountable for the deaths 
of enemy combatants, then the agent of their death is not a duty-
bearer to whom they have ceded their claim right against being 
targeted. Being killed is thus a violation of their rights. 
Sparrow also objects to the use of AWS because it is a 
weapon mala in se in virtue of failing to acknowledge the humanity 
of combatants. Employing a weapon that kills without 
acknowledging the humanity of its victims is disrespectful of those 
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victims. The problem for this objection is that there is another clear 
sense in which, if AWS will be better than human personnel at 
discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate targets, 
employing AWS in combat is highly respectful of its victims: it 
provides greater assurance to targets of aggression that, should they 
be rendered illegitimate targets because of surrender or 
incapacitation, they will not be unjustly killed. Here too our 
objection, based on MEC, can close a hole in Sparrow’s argument. 
The sort of disrespect that is expressed when one employs AWS is 
not ameliorated by observing that AWS will kill all and only 
legitimate targets, because AWS are not authorized to kill in the 
first place. AWS are not duty-bearers, and so combatants cannot 
cede a claim-right to AWS against being targeted by them. All AWS 
targets are illegitimate targets. This is the fundamental reason that 
AWS’s inability to acknowledge the humanity of its victims renders 
its use disrespectful of those victims. 
Finally, two of the authors have elsewhere argued that using 
AWS is morally objectionable because AWS are unable to make 
moral judgments or to act for moral reasons in deciding whom to 
kill. The trouble for this objection was that it cuts both ways: if 
AWS cannot act for the right reasons, then neither can they act for 
the wrong reasons. So, whether the objection is successful depends 
on how we ought to interpret the in bello requirement, if there is 
one, that soldiers act for the right reasons. Moreover, whether this 
objection identifies a genuine moral difference between AWS and 
other widely accepted methods of waging war ultimately depends 
on the reasons for which most human soldiers act in deciding whom 
to kill. If most human soldiers act from evil motives in wartime, 
then a moral concern for acting for the right reasons would compel 
us to welcome human replacement by AWS. Our objection, based 
on MEC, can explain why the inability of AWS to act for moral 
reasons renders its use morally problematic without (a) a 
commitment to the view that waging war justly requires that 
soldiers act for the right reasons in deciding whom to kill or (b) 
assuming that most human soldiers act from morally good motives. 
On the argument propounded in this paper, it is the capacity to act 
for moral reasons that matters, not the exercise of that capacity. 
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The capacity to act for moral reasons is morally significant, because 
it is necessary to be a duty-bearer, and a combatant cedes his right 
to be killed only to duty-bearing enemy combatants. Because AWS 
cannot act for reasons, it cannot be a duty-bearer. When AWS kills 
a combatant, the agent of the combatant’s death is not a duty-
bearer to whom they have ceded their claim right against being 
targeted. Being killed by AWS is thus a violation of their rights. 
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